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Abstract  
Increasingly  minority  youth,  especially   from  Muslim  backgrounds,  have  been  seen   in  Australian  public  policy  and  the  
media   as   potentially   disruptive   and   transgressive.   In   some   European   societies   similar   young   people   have   been   por-­‐
trayed  as  living  in  parallel  and  disconnected  social  spaces,  self-­‐segregated  from  interaction  with  the  wider  community.  
Yet  Australian  ethnic  minority  youth  do  not  fulfil  either  of  these  stereotypes.  Rather,  despite  their  often  regular  experi-­‐
ences  of  racism  or  discrimination,  they  continue  to  assert  a  strong  identification  with  and  belonging  to  Australian  socie-­‐
ty,  albeit  the  society  that  marginalizes  and  denigrates  their  cultural  capital.  In  particular  it  is  the  neighbourhood  and  the  
locality  that  provides  the  bridge  between  their  home  cultures  and  the  broader  world,  contributing  to  a  range  of  positive  
aspirations  and  fluid  identities.  
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1.  Immigration  and  Social  Transformation:    
An  Introduction  
Since  the  beginning  of  this  century  immigration  to  Aus-­‐
tralia  has  accelerated,  accompanied  by  a  major  rise   in  
shorter-­‐stay  residents  such  as  contract  workers  and  in-­‐
ternational   students.   As   immigration   has   once   more  
burgeoned,  so  the  youth  component  of  the   immigrant  
population  (born  overseas  and  born  locally  of  overseas  
born   parents)   has   also   expanded   (Collins,   2013).   This  
paper   asks:  what  does   the  expanding  presence  of  mi-­‐
nority  youth  mean  for  the  social  transformation  of  Aus-­‐
tralian  society?  As  analysts  such  as  Anita  Harris  (2010)  
have  argued,  public  policy   is   increasingly  perturbed  by  
the   apparent   growing   marginalisation   of   minority  
youth  from  mainstream  culture,  yet  the  public  conver-­‐
sation   about   these   concerns   fails   to   recognise   either  
the   super-­‐globalisation   that   has   transformed   national  
boundaries,  or  the  densification  of  diasporic  communi-­‐
ties   that   globalisation   has   thus   enabled.  Our   research  
on  minority  youth  reported  and  discussed  in  this  paper,  
explores   to   what   extent   minority   youth   are   indeed  
͞marginalised͟,   and   what   the   implications   may   be   of  
their   relationship   to  questions  of   identity   and  belong-­‐
ing.   We   ask   whether   the   social   transformations   that  
are   discernable   are   producing   marginalisation,   and   if  
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they  are,  are  these  tensions  productive  of  positive   so-­‐
cial   transformations   leading   to  new   forms  of   inclusion  
and   belonging,   even   if   they   are   no   longer   codified   in  
some  archaic,  unitary  and  undifferentiated  idea  of  the  
nation?  
We   begin   by   setting   the   context,   then   we   explore  
what   we   mean   by   social   transformation,   and   then   we  
proceed  to  identify  and  investigate  the  place  of  minority  
youth  in  the  processes  we  examine.  Finally  we  assess  the  
implications  for  public  policy  of  the  situations  we  report.    
Australia  has  been  a  society  formed  by  immigration  
since   its   first   invasion  and  settlement  by  Europeans   in  
the  late  eighteenth  century,  so  that  much  of  its  history  
has  been  concerned  with  government  control  over  the  
makeup  of  its  population.  Australia  had  a  culturally  di-­‐
verse  population  in  the  nineteenth  century;  the  original  
Indigenous  population  encompassed  many  hundreds  of  
nations,  while   the   gold   rushes   in  particular  drew   tens  
of   thousands   of   fortune-­‐seekers   including   significant  
numbers   of   Chinese   and   other   Asians.   Much   of   this  
non-­‐European   immigrant   diversity   was   stalled   by   the  
White   Australia   immigration   restriction   policies   intro-­‐
duced  after  Federation  in  1901,  while  Indigenous  popu-­‐
lations  also  fell  under  the  impact  of  introduced  diseas-­‐
es,   frontier   violence   and   the   loss   of   land.   For   three  
generations   after   the   foundation   of   the   Common-­‐
wealth,  national  policy   focussed  on  building  a  popula-­‐
tion  by  excluding  ͞non-­‐White͟   immigration  and  expel-­‐
ling  non-­‐White  settlers,  while  assimilating  the  surviving  
Indigenous  peoples.  After  World  War  II,  national  policy  
expanded  its  search  for  immigrants  to  non-­‐British  parts  
of  Europe,  while  retaining  barriers  to  non-­‐White  entry.  
In  a  short  period  from  the  mid-­‐1960s  to  the  mid-­‐1970s  
however,  governments  of  both  conservative  and  Labor  
orientation  opened  up  immigration  to  new  populations  
from  across  the  world  (Jakubowicz,  2009).    
From  about  1970  onwards  migration   included  new  
intakes   of   Muslims   in   what   had   been   in   the   past   an  
overwhelming   European   Christian   immigration   intake;  
it   also   began   to   include   significant   numbers   of   both  
Christians  and  non-­‐Christians  from  Indo-­‐China  and  Chi-­‐
na,  and  from  the  Middle  East.  Later  it  would  also  draw  
in  people   from  many  African  countries,  both  Christian  
and  Muslim,  so  that  by  Census  Day  2011  Australia  was  
no  longer  recognisable  in  its  ethno-­‐cultural  diversity  as  
the  country   it  had  been  two  generations  before   (DIAC  
2013;  Ho  &  Jakubowicz,  2013).  Importantly  the  diversi-­‐
ty  of  Australian  society  means  that  the  huge  concentra-­‐
tions   of   particular   immigrant   groups   in   specific   locali-­‐
ties   that   characterise   many   European   countries   and  
have   been   linked   to   the   ͞failure   of   multiculturalism͟  
(Jakubowicz,   2013;   Meer   &   Modood,   2011;   Modood,  
2012)  are  not  part  of  the  Australian  urban  scene.  Nev-­‐
ertheless  long-­‐entrenched  structures  of  racial  exclusion  
and   hierarchies   continue,   especially   in   some   areas   of  
major  cities,  driven  in  part  by  regular  moral  panics  over  
threats   to   the   social   order   that   these   immigrants   and  
their   children  might   represent   (Dunn,  Klocker,  &   Sala-­‐
bay,  2007;  Markus,  2014).  
These   increasingly   diverse   diaspora   communities  
are   one   of   the   local   consequences   of  well-­‐recognised  
global   processes   of   ͞social   transformation͟,   especially  
those   accelerated   by   neo-­‐liberal   economic   develop-­‐
ment   on   the   one   hand,   and   major   local   conflicts   in  
source  countries  on  the  other  (Castles,  de  Hass,  &  Miller,  
2014).   Today   the   newest  waves   of   arrivals   enter   Aus-­‐
tralia   in   very  different   circumstances   and  encounter   a  
very  different  economic  dynamic  to  those  that  greeted  
the   first   generation   of   post-­‐White   Australia   immigra-­‐
tion  after  the  1970s   (Collins,  1991;   Jakubowicz,  2009).  
The   social   transformation   now   underway   in   Australia  
plays   a   key   role   in   generating   the   opportunities   and  
constraints   that   young   people   from   newer   immigrant  
groups   experience,   often   in   ways   not   previously   con-­‐
sidered   by   public   policy.   Specifically   the   neo-­‐liberal  
driver  behind  social  transformation  (Castles,  de  Haas,  &  
Miller,   2014)   appears   to   generate   specific   challenges  
for  minority   youth   in   relation   to   their   familial   and   so-­‐
cially-­‐acquired  cultural  capital  (Shah,  Dwyer,  &  Modood,  
2010)   including  its  value  to  them  for  gaining  access  to  
the  wider  opportunities  of  a  multicultural  society   such  
as  Australia.  
Four   factors   are   important   in   positioning   the   de-­‐
bate  about  immigrant  youth  in  contemporary  Australia.  
Given  that  our  interest  is  in  how  youth  from  immigrant  
communities  perceive  and  are  perceived  by  Australian  
society,  we  wish   to  outline   these   factors  and   then  ex-­‐
plore  how  they  interrelate.    
First  the  economic  restructuring  that  has  character-­‐
ised   the   decades   after   1983   with   the   floating   of   the  
Australian  dollar,  deregulation  of  finance  and  reduction  
of   tariff   protection,   has   further   integrĂƚĞĚ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛Ɛ
economy  into  that  of  the  wider  region  and  internation-­‐
ally.  As  a  consequence  many   industries   that  sought   to  
recruit   lower   skilled   migrant   labour   in   the   past,   have  
now  either  heavily  upgraded  the  technologies  they  use  
and   thus   the   skill   base  of   the  workforce   they   require,  
or   have   failed   and   closed   in   increasingly   competitive  
business  environments  (as  has  the  motor  vehicle  man-­‐
ufacturing   industry   over   2013   and   2014)   (Collins,  
2013).   For   immigrant   families,   especially   those  with   a  
fairly   low  skill  base  (including  some  refugee  communi-­‐
ties)   (Refugee   Council   of   Australia,   2011)   the   loss   of  
employment  by  the  first  ͞father͟  and  ͞mother͟  gener-­‐
ation  has  seriously  disrupted  family  life  (Colic-­‐Peisker  &  
Tilbury,   2007).   Lack   of   employment   opportunity   has  
become  an  increasingly  vital  factor  in  the  public  activi-­‐
ties  of  ͞second  (or  even  third)  generation͟  youth,  feed-­‐
ing   drivers   that   push   some   young   people   into   the   in-­‐
formal  or  ͞black͟  economy  (Abdelkerim  &  Grace,  2012).  
Education  institutions  have  become  front-­‐line  agencies  
in  managing  the  impact  of  this  changing  political  econ-­‐
omy  on  the   life  chances  and  public  attitudes  of  young  
people  (Liddy,  2012).    
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Second,  cities  such  as  Sydney,  Perth  and  Melbourne  
have   become   geographically   segmented,   where   some  
localities  can  draw  on   industries   that  are  more  closely  
tied   to   the   economic   opportunities   of   an   increasing  
globalised  market,   while   others   are  more   locally   con-­‐
strained,  offering  fewer  possibilities  for  growth.  More-­‐
over   in   these   cities   three   in   five   of   people   are   either  
first   or   second-­‐generation   immigrants   (born   overseas  
or  parent  born  overseas);  overall   some  43  per  cent  of  
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ͞immigrant͟   in  that  sense  (Ho  
&   Jakubowicz,   2013).   Yet   unlike  many  European   cities  
ŵŽƐƚ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƐ ŝŶ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛Ɛ Đities   are   diverse  
rather   than   monocultural;   it   is   difficult   therefore   to  
speak  of  them  as  ͞ethnic  ghettoes͟  specific  to  any  par-­‐
ticular   ethnic   or   immigrant   group.   It   is   exactly   the   di-­‐
versity  of  locality,  however,  that  makes  attitudes  to  the  
local  area  among  young  second  generation  women  and  
men   such   a   useful   barometer   of   their   identification  
with  Australian  society  more  broadly.    
Third   as   globalisation   has   provided   increasing   op-­‐
portunities   for   travel   to  homeland  societies,  and  tech-­‐
nology   has   opened   up   instantaneous   communication  
between  homelands  and  Australia,  the  time  space  bar-­‐
riers   that   used   to   press   so   heavily   on   earlier   genera-­‐
tions   of   immigrants   in   relation   to   sustaining   diasporic  
links  have  effectively  been  relegated  to  history.  Global-­‐
isation   has   therefŽƌĞ ŐƌĞĂƚůǇ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝǌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ͚ŶĂͲ
ƚŝŽŶĂů͛ ŝŶ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͕ ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐ ĚŝĂƐƉŽƌŝĐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ďĞ
easily  accessed  and  sustained  (Collins  et  al.,  2012).  For  
youth   from   minority   immigrant   communities   (short-­‐
handed   here   as   ͞minority   youth͟)   their   sense   of   per-­‐
sonal   status   and   identity   has   to   continually   negotiate  
their  changing  perceptions  of  their  parental  homeland  
societies  and  culture,  their  own  identification  with  Aus-­‐
tralia,  and  their  perception  of  how  they  are  perceived  
in  Australia  by  others  from  outside  their  communities.  
Identity   is   thus   a   contingent   process   (Colic-­‐Peisker   &  
Walker,  2003)  rather  than  a  fixed  state,  and  its  expres-­‐
sion   can   vary   considerably,   responding   to   personal,  
communal,   societal   and   global   conflicts   (McLeod   &  
Yates,  1999).  
Fourth,   the   cultural   capital   of   minority   youth   has  
become   an   increasing   controversial   framework   for  
analysis  of  their  experiences  (Jakubowicz,  2011).  The  use  
of  cultural  (Wimmer,  2007)  and  social  capital  (Bourdieu,  
1986;   Bassani,   2007)   as   conceptual   lenses   through  
which   the   aspirations   and   experiences   of   immigrant  
youth  can  be  interpreted  has  become  an  important  av-­‐
enue  for  research.  Schaefer-­‐McDaniel  (2004)  in  her  re-­‐
view  of   social   capital   has   argued   that   for   youth   three  
dimensions   are   crucial:   their   social   networks,   interac-­‐
tions  and  sociability;  their  levels  of  trusts  and  reciproci-­‐
ty  in  peer  and  community  relations;  and  their  sense  of  
belonging  and  attachment  to  place  (as  discussed  by  Hill  
&  Bessant,  1999).  Modood  and  his  colleagues  in  the  UK  
(Shah,   Dwyer,   &  Modood,   2010)   have   taken   the   con-­‐
cept   of   cultural   capital,   as   initially   proposed   by   Bour-­‐
dieu  (2010),  and  argued  that  cultural  capital  should  not  
be  separated  from  its  close  links  to  socioeconomic  class  
factors   and   personal   economic   capital.   Even   so,   they  
suggest   that   class  per   se  does  not  provide  a   sufficient  
framework   for   analysis   without   the   insights   provided  
through  a  more  anthropological  and  political  inflection  
drawn  from  specific  cultural  analyses.  Thus  their  elabo-­‐
ration  of  ͞ethnic   (cultural  and  social)  capital͟  helpfully  
extends  how  we  might  explore  and   interpret  the   lived  
experiences  of  immigrant  youth,  within  the  framework  
of   structural   constraints   and   cultural   hierarchies   that  
they   encounter   in   a  multicultural   society   like   Austral-­‐
iaͶwith  its  continuing  racialised  patterns  of  advantage  
and   disadvantage.   A   tension   has   been   identified   be-­‐
tween   in-­‐group   focussed  ͞bonding͟   social   capital,   and  
other-­‐group   linking   ͞bridging͟   social   capital   in   diverse  
multicultural   neighbourhoods.   Diversity,   it   has   been  
argued  (e.g.,  Putnam,  2002)  reduces  inter-­‐ethnic  trust,  
tending   to   reinforce   bonding   relationships   at   the   ex-­‐
pense  of  bridging,  potentially  fragmenting  localities  in-­‐
to   pockets   of   bonded  monocultures   that   interact   but  
do  not  integrate.  These  worries  can  be  key  contributors  
to   moral   panics   over   the   local   presence   of   minority  
youth.    
2.  Who  Are  Immigrant  Youth?  
The  most   recent  Australian  Census   (Australian  Bureau  
of   Statistics,   2011)  demonstrates   the   rapidly   changing  
makeup  of  immigrant  minority  youth.  For  our  purposes  
we  are  setting  the  parameters  of  this  group  by  their  re-­‐
gions   of   birth,   their   non-­‐European   origins,   and   the  
presence   among   them   of   significant   Muslim   groups.  
These  parameters  derive   from  their   fairly   low  position  
on   an   ethnic   ladder   of   status   that   places   European-­‐
Australians   at   the   top,   and   non-­‐Europeans   further  
down   the   list.   The   hierarchy   is   compounded   by   class  
factors,  partly  reflected  in  the  occupations  of  their  par-­‐
ents,   and  partly   for  older   youth,   in   their   own  occupa-­‐
tions  or  lack  of  them.  Intergenerational  social  mobility,  
a  key  goal  of  many  migrants,  further  confuses  the  eth-­‐
nicity/class   interaction   (Redmond,  Wong,   Bradbury,  &  
Katz,  2014).  Finally,  while  religious  identity  is  not  a  de-­‐
fining   characteristic   of   minority   status,   and   does   not  
point   to   class   position   or   to   educational   attainment,  
the  stereotyping  of  Muslims  has  been  one  of  the  more  
controversial  aspects  of   their  marginalisation   in  public  
discourse.   In   addition   to   the   overseas   born,   minority  
youth   also   encompasses   many   young   people   born   in  
Australia  of   immigrant  parents,  who  fit  the  concept  of  
͞visible   minority͟.   The   continuity   between   Australian  
born  and  immigrant  lies  most  often  in  their  shared  ex-­‐
periences   of   racism,   discrimination   and   disadvantage  
(Collins  et  al.,  2012).    
In  a  population  of  21.5  million,  there  were  1.4  mil-­‐
lion   young   people   aged   15ʹ19,   and   1.46  million   aged  
20   to  24  at   the   2011   Census.   Together   they   comprise  
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some  13  per  cent  of  the  population.  Young  people  born  
outside   Australia   made   up   13   per   cent   of   15ʹ19   year  
olds,  and  22  per  cent  of  20ʹ24  year  olds.  Non-­‐Europeans  
made  up  some  115,000  of   the  15ʹ19  year  olds   (about  
2/3   of   the   overseas   born),   and   about   265,000   of   the  
20ʹ24   year   olds   (some   77   per   cent   of   the   overseas  
born).  The  largest  overseas  born  groups  are  those  from  
North   and   East   Asia   (about   24   per   cent),   South   East  
Asia   (20   per   cent),   Oceania   (17   per   cent)   South   and  
Central  Asia   (16  per  cent),  North  West  Europe  (14  per  
cent),  Sub  Saharan  Africa  (7.5  per  cent)  and  North  Afri-­‐
ca   and   the  Middle   East   (6.7   per   cent).   Of   those   born  
overseas   the   largest   group   (35   per   cent)   comes   from  
South  and  Central  Asia  (especially  Pakistan  and  Afghan-­‐
istan),   then  North   Africa   and   the  Middle   East   (30   per  
cent)   (especially  Somalia,   Lebanon  and   Iraq),   followed  
by  South  East  Asia  (11  per  cent)  and  sub-­‐Saharan  Africa  
(8  per  cent).  Muslim  youth  make  up  about  3  per  cent  of  
the   whole   youth   cohort   in   Australia,   perhaps   surpris-­‐
ingly  low  given  the  level  of  critical  attention  focused  on  
young  Muslims,  especially  males.  Muslim  young  people  
born  in  Australia  represent  the  single  largest  country  of  
origin   (45%),   and   are   increasingly   of   Australian-­‐born  
parents.  As   indicated  by   the  Census   (ABS,   2011)  how-­‐
ever,   the   cultural   diversity   among   Muslims   is   great,  
with  over  60  different  national  origins  identifiable.    
3.  What  Our  Research  Reveals  About  Immigrant  
Youth:  Key  Parameters    
We   turn   now   to   examine   how   these   four   parameters  
are   extended  when   applied   to   two   commissioned   re-­‐
search  projects  on  immigrant  youth.  Our  projects  were  
initiated  by  government  bodies  during  the  period  of  a  
national   Labor   Government   between   2007   and   2011,  
and  were  carried  out  for  the  federal  bureaucracy  of  the  
Department   of   Immigration   and   Citizenship.   In   each  
case  the  research  was  framed  by  a  wider  public  debate,  
each  with  their  own  element  of  moral  panic,  about  the  
integration   of   immigrant   youth,   their   identification  
with  Australian  social  values  as  expressed  by  key  elites  
and   reinforced   in   the  media,   and   concerns   expressed  
by   the  communities   from  which   they  came  about   ste-­‐
reotyping,  marginalisation   and   social   exclusion   (Dunn,  
Klocker,  &  Salabay,  2007).    
The   first   survey  was  of  340  youthͶ144  males  and  
195  femalesͶaged  from  14  to  17  years  living  in  Western  
and  South-­‐Western  Sydney  (Collins,  Reid,  Fabiansson,  &  
Healey,  2010).  Stratified  sampling  was  employed  to  en-­‐
sure  that  at  least  80  per  cent  of  respondents  were  first  
or   second   generation   male   or   female   youth   from   a  
wide  range  of  minority  backgrounds,  with  minority  de-­‐
fined   as   being   of   a   culturally   and   linguistically   diverse  
background  (CALD).  We  refer  to  this  as  the  2007  CALD  
ƐƚƵĚǇ ;͞CY͟Ϳ͘ dŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝty   of   youth   surveyedͶ75   per  
cent   of  males   and   61   per   cent   of   femalesͶwere   sec-­‐
ond   generation   immigrants   that   is,   born   in   Australia  
but  with  one  or  both  parents  born  overseas.  The  larg-­‐
est  group  of  mothers  was  born  in  Tonga  (25.6  per  cent)  
followed   by   Korea   (11.2   per   cent),   Lebanon   (10.8   per  
cent)   and   Sudan   (10.5   per   cent).   The   largest   group  of  
fathers  was  also  was  born  in  Tonga  (24.5  per  cent),  fol-­‐
lowed  by  Korea   (11.3  per   cent)   Sudan   (10.9  per   cent)  
and  Lebanon  (10.6  per  cent).  Others  were  born  in  New  
Zealand,   Sri   Lanka,   India,   China   and  England.  Only  4.3  
per  cent  of  the  mothers  and  4.4  per  cent  of  the  fathers  
were  born  in  Australia.    
The   second   survey   of   332   young  male   and   female  
Muslim  Australians  conducted  at  the  Muslim  Eid  Festi-­‐
val   and   Fair   in   Sydney   in   2010.   This   survey   differed  
from  the  one  above  in  that  it  also  included  informants  
aged  15  to  25:  165  informants  were  aged  under  18  and  
167  aged  between  18  and  25.  We  refer   to   this  as   the  
ϮϬϭϬDƵƐůŝŵzŽƵƚŚƐƚƵĚǇ;͞MY͟Ϳ͘Like  CY,  the  majority  
(73   per   cent   of   the   respondents   aged   15ʹ25   years)  
were   second  generation   immigrants  born   in  Australia.  
First   generation   informants   were  mostly   born   in   Iraq,  
Pakistan  and  Lebanon,  although  respondents  were  also  
drawn  from  another  26  birthplaces  reflecting  the  great  
diversity   of   the   Australian   Muslim   community.   The  
overwhelming   majority   (94   per   cent)   of   respondents  
were  Australian  citizens.    
The  methodology  employed  for  both  surveys  drew  
on   a   multi-­‐entry   snowball   sample,   rather   than   a   ran-­‐
dom   sample.   This   method   allowed   us   to   use   pre-­‐
existing   networks   of   trusted   relationships.   These   two  
surveys   provide   some   insight   into   immigrant   youth   in  
contemporary   Australian   society   in   general,   and   into  
aspects   related   to   their   social   capital   and   social   rela-­‐
tionships   and   their   subjective   take  on  matters   related  
to   identities   and   belonging   in   particular.   The   four   pa-­‐
rameters   allowed  an  examination  of  how  different   el-­‐
ements  of  the  lives  of  our  research  subjects  were  inter-­‐
connected.    
4.  Employment  Opportunities  
Conservative  and  Labor  Governments  in  Australia  have  
enthusiastically  embraced  the  globalisation  agendas  of  
deregulation   of   finance,   reduction   of   tariff   levels   and  
the   privatisation   of   public   sector   assets   and   institu-­‐
tions.  This  has  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  Australian  
economy   in  general,  and  the  Australian   labour  market  
in   particular,   with   secondary   industries   like   manufac-­‐
turing   continuing   to   decline   as   tariff   protection   has  
been  reduced  or  eliminated,  while  services  sector  jobs  
continue   to   increase.  At   the   same   time  Australian   im-­‐
migration   policy   has   been   fine-­‐tuned   to   embrace   the  
globalisation  agenda  (Collins,  2013;  Jakubowicz,  2013).  
There  are  a  number  of  interrelated  developments.  Im-­‐
migration   intakes   have   reached   record   levels,   despite  
the  Global  Finance  Crisis   (Collins,  2008).  While   the  UK  
and   New   Zealand   remain   the   major   source   countries  
for   Australian   immigration,   intakes   from   Asia,   Africa  
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and  the  Middle  East  have  increased  considerably  in  the  
past   decade   while   skilled   and   highly   qualified   perma-­‐
nent   and   temporary   immigrants   are   prioritized   over  
permanent   family   and   humanitarian   entrants,   though  
most   skilled   immigrants   bring   family   dependents  with  
them.  A  significant  proportion  of  those  arriving  in  Aus-­‐
tralia  under  the  Refugee  and  Humanitarian  Program  are  
young  people,  with  59  per  cent  of  new  entrants  arriving  
in  the  five  years  between  July  2005  and  June  2010  aged  
under  25  years  on  arrival,  and  31  per  cent  aged  between  
12  and  25  (Refugee  Council  of  Australia,  2011).  
Employment  is  a  key  factor  in  successful  immigrant  
settlement   and   on   the   socioeconomic   outcomes   for  
first  and  second  generation  immigrants,   including  those  
whose  parents  arrived   in  Australia   some  decades  ago.  
Employment  opportunities  for  minority  immigrants,  in-­‐
cluding   young   people,   have   been   shaped   by   the   re-­‐
structuring  of  the  Australian  economy  that  has  accom-­‐
panied   globalisation.   Changing   patterns   of   labour  
market   segmentation   in  Australia   show   that  CALD   im-­‐
migrants   with   tertiary   education   and   skills   in   the   ser-­‐
vices   sector   tend   to   get   good   jobs   and   incomes  while  
other  CALD  immigrants  with  lower  levels  of  education-­‐
al  achievementͶincluding  many  Muslim  immigrantsͶ
are  concentrated  in  jobs  in  the  declining  manufacturing  
sector  or  lower  level  jobs  in  the  services  sector  (Foroutan,  
2008).  On  average,  unemployment  rates  for  immigrants  
are  only  slightly  higher  than  non-­‐immigrants  (Australian  
Productivity   Commission,   2006),   although   immigrant  
minorities   experienced   larger   increases   in   unemploy-­‐
ment   in   the   economic   downturn   following   the   Global  
Financial  Crisis   (Hugo,   2011b;  Collins,  2011).   But  aver-­‐
ages   conceal   a   variety   of   different   immigrant   labour  
market   experiences   for   CALD   immigrants.   More   dis-­‐
aggregated  analysis  by  ancestry  (a  proxy  for  ethnicity),  
generation,   religion  or  by  category  of   immigrant  entry  
reveals  significant  variation  about  the  mean  in  terms  of  
unemployment   rates   for   immigrants.   For   example,  
2006  Australian  Census  data  reveals  that  first  and  sec-­‐
ond   generation   immigrants   of   Lebanese/Middle   East-­‐
ern  ancestry,   or  Vietnamese   and  North  African  ances-­‐
try,   had   rates   of   unemployment   two-­‐to-­‐three   times  
higher  than  average.  Twenty-­‐two  per  cent  of  the  Viet-­‐
namese   second   generation   and   15   per   cent   of   the  
North  African/Middle  East  second  generation  were  un-­‐
employed  at  a  time  when  the  Australian  economy  was  
generally  regarded  as  fully  employed  with  average  na-­‐
tional  unemployment  rates  between  5ʹ6  per  cent  (Col-­‐
lins,  2011).  Muslim   immigrants  also  suffer   significantly  
higher   unemployment   rates   than   others,   with   preju-­‐
dice   and   discrimination   as   key   factors   (Lovatt   et   al.,  
2011).  Refugees  are  the  most  disadvantaged  cohort  of  
immigrant  arrivals  and  face  the  greatest  settlement  dif-­‐
ficulties  in  Australia:  one-­‐third  of  refugee-­‐humanitarian  
entrant   settlers   remain   unemployed   after   three   years  
of  settlement  in  Australia  (Hugo,  2011a,  p.  104).  More-­‐
over  a  2014  study  of  locality-­‐linked  youth  employment  
demonstrated  that  youth  unemployment   in  regions  of  
high   minority   residence   could   be   as   much   as   three  
times  as  high  as  the  national  average,  and  twice  as  high  
as  youth  unemployment  in  general  (though  lower  than  
rural   rates).   Discussing   the   implications   of   global   eco-­‐
nomic  restructuring  the  Report  aƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ͞ƚhe  global  
financial   crisis   has   had   a   scarring   impact   on   the   job  
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛ƐǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ͟;ƌŽƚŚĞƌŚŽŽĚŽĨ
St  Laurence,  2014;  Kwek,  2013).    
Educational   outcomes   for   CALD   immigrant   youth  
are   also   uneven.   Youth   from   families   of   professional  
and   highly   skilled   immigrant   parentsͶsuch   as   skilled  
immigrants  from  China  and  India  and  Korea,  the  largest  
countries   of   skilled   CALD   immigrant   arrivalsͶhave  
strong   educational   achievement   in  Australian   schools.  
On  the  other  hand,  first  generation  youth  from  families  
where   the   parents   have   lower   educational   qualifica-­‐
tions   and   second  generation   youth  whose  parents   ar-­‐
rived   in   earlier   decades   when   there   was   less   priority  
given   to   skilled   immigration   intakes   have   relatively  
poor   educational   outcomes   in   Australian   schools   (Red-­‐
mond   et   al.,   2014).   This   uneven   educational   perfor-­‐
mance   of   CALD   youth   in   Australia   reinforces   the   pat-­‐
terns   of   labour  market   segmentation   and   the   uneven  
labour  market  outcomes  of  CALD  youth.  Young  people  
from  refugee  families  have  relatively  poor  employment  
and   educational   outcomes   compared   to   other   CALD  
youth  and  to  Australian  youth  as  a  whole  (Abdelkerim  
&  Grace,  2012).  
Minority  youth  bear  many  of  the  costs  of  ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛Ɛ
globalisation   and   neo-­‐liberal   economic   agendas.   As  
such   employment   opportunities   decline,   higher   levels  
of   more   technically   advanced   skills   are   required,   and  
school  and  other  public  education  systems  suffer  under  
government  funding  cuts,  and  there  is  a  ͞flight͟  of  mid-­‐
dle  class  children  to  private  (fee-­‐paying)  schools  associ-­‐
ated  with   religious  or   cultural   communities   (Redmond  
et  al.,  2014).    
5.  Urban  Segregation  
Most  Australian  immigrants  settle  in  the  large  Australi-­‐
an   cities   of   Sydney,   Melbourne,   Perth,   Brisbane   and  
Adelaide   (Hugo,  2011b;  Hugo,  Feist,  &  Tan,  2013).  But  
immigrant   settlement   is   not   evenly   distributed  within  
these  cities,  particularly  for  CALD  immigrant  minorities.  
This   is   particularly   evident   in   Sydney   and  Melbourne,  
AustƌĂůŝĂ͛Ɛ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŝƚŝĞƐǁŚĞƌĞŽǀĞƌŚĂůĨŽĨĂůůƵƐƚƌĂůͲ
ŝĂ͛Ɛ ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ƐĞƚƚůĞ͘ > ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶĐĞŶͲ
trated   in   the   western   and   south-­‐western   suburbs   of  
Sydney   and   the  western   suburbs   of  Melbourne;   how-­‐
ever   specific   ethnicities   never   approach   a  majority   of  
the   immigrant   population   (Islam   is   not   classed   as   an  
ethnicity,  but  rather  as  a  faith  community).    
Not   surprisingly   then  Muslim   immigrants   also   con-­‐
centrate   in  these  areas.  According  to  the  2006  Census  
nearly   half   (47.3   per   cent)   of   Muslims   in   Australian  
  Social  Inclusion,  2014,  Volume  2,  Issue  2,  Pages  5-­‐16   10  
lived  in  Sydney,  while  just  under  a  third  (30.3  per  cent)  
lived   in  Melbourne   (DIAC,   2007,   p.   6).   By   2006   seven  
out  of  the  top  ten  Australian  suburbs  of  Muslim  immi-­‐
grant   settlement  were   in  Western  and  South-­‐Western  
^ǇĚŶĞǇ͗ƵďƵƌŶ͕ŝŶ^ǇĚŶĞǇ͛ƐǁĞƐƚĞƌŶƐƵďƵƌďƐ,  was  the  
most  Muslim  Australian   suburb,  with  24.8  per   cent  of  
the  population   reporting   that   Islam  was   their   religion,  
followed  by  Bankstown  (15.2  per  cent)  and  Canterbury  
(13.7   per   cent)   (DIAC,   2007,   p.   7).   Patterns   of   immi-­‐
grant  settlement  are  changing  as  newly-­‐arrived  profes-­‐
sional   and   tertiary   educated   immigrants   move   to  
ǁĞĂůƚŚŝĞƌ ƐƵďƵƌďƐ͕ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŚĂƚƐǁŽŽĚ ŝŶ ^ǇĚŶĞǇ͛Ɛ
North   Shore   for   Chinese   immigrants   and   inner   north-­‐
west  suburbs  of  Strathfield  and  Eastwood  for  the  Syd-­‐
ney   Korean   population.   At   the   2013   election   the   ten  
federal  electorates  with  the  highest  proportion  of  Mus-­‐
lims   were   in   western   Sydney   or   Melbourne,   and   the  
top  five  Vietnamese  seats  were  in  the  same  areas;  they  
were  all  held  by  the  Labor  Party  until  the  election.  The  
Chinese  population  was  more  dispersed  across  geogra-­‐
phy   and   evinced   a   wider   partisan   representation  
(Mumble  Census  Gallery,  2013).    
Urban   unemployment   rates   in   Australia   reflect   the  
cultural   geography   of   Australian   cities.   These   western  
suburbs  of  Sydney  and  Melbourne  are  the  areas  where  
the   manufacturing   industry   in   located,   and   so   exhibit  
high   unemployment   rates.   For   example,   in   2013  while  
^ǇĚŶĞǇ͛Ɛ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ ĞĂĐŚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƐƚĞƌŶ ^ƵďƵƌďƐ ŚĂĚ
unemployment   rates   of   2.1   per   cent   and   3.2   per   cent  
respectively,   Fairfield-­‐LiverpoolͶperhaps   the   densest  
area   of   minority   immigrant   settlement   in   AustraliaͶ
experienced   an   unemployment   rate   of   7.1   per   cent.  
^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ͕DĞůďŽƵƌŶĞ͛ƐKƵƚĞƌtĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĂƌĞĂ ŚĂĚ ƵŶĞŵͲ
ployment  rates  of  7.1  per  cent  while   in  North  Western  
Melbourne   the   unemployment   rate   was   9.4   per   cent.  
Broadmeadows,   a   Melbourne   western   suburb   with   a  
very  high  CALD  and  Muslim  population,  is  set  to  experi-­‐
ence  much  higher  unemployment  rates  as  the  Australi-­‐
an   car   industry   closes   down.   Unemployment   rates   are  
higher  for  youth  than  adults.  When  viewed  through  the  
lens  of  cultural  geography,  it  is  clear  that  minority  youth  
who  live  in  areas  such  as  western  Sydney  have  very  high  
unemployment   rates.   In  May  2012,   for  example,  when  
the  overall  unemployment  rate  for  Western  Sydney  was  
5.5  per  cent,  for  youth  it  was  17.9  per  cent,  with  youth  in  
Fairfield   Liverpool   experiencing  much   higher   unemploy-­‐
ment  (Montoya,  2012).  Muslim  unemployment  rates  are  
more  than  double  the  average  (Masanauskas,  2012).  
Immigrant   settlement   patterns   suggest   that   while  
new  immigrants  concentrate  in  areas  such  as  the  west-­‐
ern  suburbs  of  Sydney  and  Melbourne,  immigrant  ghet-­‐
ƚŽĞƐĚŽŶŽƚ ĞŵĞƌŐĞ͘Ɛ,ƵŐŽ ;ϮϬϭϭĂ͕Ɖ͘ ϮϰͿƉƵƚ ŝƚ͗ ͞
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ŽĨ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛Ɛ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ĐŝƚŝĞƐ
compared   with   some   other   world   cities,   however,   is  
that   while   there   are   suburbs   with   high   proportions   of  
foreign-­‐born   residents,   these   concentrations   are   not  
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă ƐŝŶŐůĞ ďŝƌƚŚƉůĂĐĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ͘͟ dŚŝƐ ĨĂĐƚ ŚĂƐ
important   implications   for   issues   related   to   the   social  
cohesion   of   minority   youth   in   Australia   and   to   their  
sense  of  belonging.  The  riots  involving  immigrant  minor-­‐
ity   youth   in   the  UK   (Bradford,   Burnley,   and  Oldham   in  
2002)  and  France  (Paris  in  2005)  occurred  in  places  with  
much  greater  concentration  of  immigrant  youth  from  a  
particular  ethnic  or  religious  background  (Collins  &  Reid,  
2009).   The  Cantel  Report   (Cantel,   2004)   into   the  Brad-­‐
ford,  Burnley,  and  Oldham  riots  identified  the  ͞depth  of  
polarisation͟  between  white  and  minority  youth  in  Brit-­‐
ain,   leading   them   to   live   disconnected   ͞parallel   lives͟.  
Our  reports  on  research  with   immigrant  youth   living   in  
the   suburbs   of   Western   and   South   Western   Sydney  
demonstrate   that   the   population   is   very   diverse   in  
terms  of  ethnic,  cultural,  religious  and  social  class,  cos-­‐
mopolitan   or   multicultural   rather   than   monocultural  
immigrant  ghettoes.  
6.  Global  Versus  Local  
As  globalisation  increases  the  immigrant  youth  popula-­‐
tions  of  all  western  nations,  there  has  been  a  growing  
anxiety   about   the   extent   that   these   immigrant   youth  
will   identify  with   the  nation  and  contribute   to  nation-­‐
building  and  social  cohesion  in  coming  decades.  These  
concerns  about  the  national  identity  of  immigrants  and  
the  extent  to  which  they  will  buy  into  and  identify  with  
their  new  nation  is  not  recent  phenomena  and  can  be  
traced  to  the  first  years  of  the  post-­‐war  Australian  im-­‐
migration  program  (Kabir,  2008).  Yet  the  recent  anxiety  
about  minority   immigrant  youthͶparticularly  those  of  
Muslim   faithͶare   sharpened   in   the   post-­‐9/11   envi-­‐
ronment,  by   the  Cronulla  beach   riot,   the  Sydney  gang  
rape  involving  Muslim  Lebanese  youth,  the  Bali  bomb-­‐
ings,   the   arrest   of   Muslim   men   in   Sydney   and   Mel-­‐
bourne   for   terrorist   activities   and,  more   recently,   the  
involvement  of  Australian  youth  of  Muslim  background  
fighting   in   the   conflict   in   Syria   (Jakubowicz,   2009).  
These  anxieties  are  generally  framed  around  a  homog-­‐
enized   and   stereotyped   racialised   construction   of   mi-­‐
nority   immigrant   cultures   and   the   Muslim   religion   as  
being   anti-­‐Western,   criminal   and   hostile   to   and   sepa-­‐
rate   fromͶrather   than   integrated   into   and   contrib-­‐
uting   to   buildingͶthe  Australian   nation   (Kabir,   2008).  
Given   the   limitations  of   social  mobility  pathways   (e.g.  
well-­‐paying  jobs  with  promotional  prospects)  for  some  
immigrant  minority  youth,  their  integration  rather  than  
their  marginalisation  and  exclusion   into  Australian   so-­‐
ciety   in  part   depends  on  how   their   identities   are   vali-­‐
dated  as  stakeholders  in  the  society.    
As   Tabar,   Noble   and   Poynting   (2003)   point   out   in  
their   research   on   Australians   of   a   Lebanese   back-­‐
ŐƌŽƵŶĚ͕ ͞ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ
through  which  we  represent  ourselves  and  others,  but  
embodies   practices   of   identification   and   adaptation  
deploying  particular  kinds  of  resources  which  we  posi-­‐
ƚŝŽŶŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ŝŶĚŝǀĞƌƐĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ͘͟ dŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵͲ
  Social  Inclusion,  2014,  Volume  2,  Issue  2,  Pages  5-­‐16   11  
ants  in  the  2007  CY  study  were  asked  to  describe  their  
national   identity.  Two   thirds  of   the  young  people   sur-­‐
veyed   were   born   in   Australia   yet   only   slightly   more  
than   one   in   three   of   the   respondents   identified   as  
͞Australian͟.   The   rest   gave   a  wide   range   of   identities  
mostly  related  to  the  country  of  origin  of  their  parents.  
This  supports  the  argument  that  minority  youth  in  Syd-­‐
ney  have  diverse,  fluid  and  multiple  identities.  Butcher  
and  Thomas  (2003)  who  also  interviewed  young  people  
in  western  Sydney,  found  that  they  forged  hybrid  iden-­‐
tities   that   incorporate   their  migrant   identities  with  el-­‐
ements  of  ͞being  Australian͟.    
A   slightly   different   but   related   question   about  
whether  the  informants  in  the  2007  CY  survey  felt  Aus-­‐
tralian  all   the   time,  often,   sometimes  or   rarely,   found  
that   about   half   of   the   respondents   ͞felt   Australian͟  
(48.5   per   cent)   all   the   time   or   often.   Two   in   three  
ǇŽƵŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŽ ͞often   feeling   good   about  
ůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͟ĂŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽŶĞŝŶĨŽƵƌǇŽƵŶŐƉĞŽͲ
ƉůĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽ͞sometimes  feeling  good  about  living  in  
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͟ǁŚŝůĞĂĨŝĨƚŚŽf  the  young  people  did  not  re-­‐
ally   feel   ͞Australian͟   at   all.   Despite   this   finding   most  
(two   in   three   respondents)   liked   living   in   their  Sydney  
suburb  and  felt  that  they  belonged  in  and  had  owner-­‐
ship  of  their  local  neighbourhoods.  On  the  other  hand,  
one  in  three  males  and  one  in  four  females  ͞rarely͟  or  
͞never͟  felt  ownership  of  their  local  area.    
The   youth   surveyed   demonstrated   strong   aspira-­‐
tions  and  a  confidence  about  their   future   in  Australia.  
Only   a   few   of   the   youths   expressed   pessimism   about  
their  chances  of  achieving  their  preferred  occupation  in  
the   future.   When   asked   to   nominate   their   most   im-­‐
portant   values,   friendship,   honesty,   trust,   family,   re-­‐
spect  and  loyalty  were  the  most  frequently  mentioned.  
The  Muslim   youth   survey   (2010  MY)   inquired   into  
many   of   the   issues   explored   in   the   earlier   survey,   in-­‐
cluding  subjective  assessments  of   identity  and  belong-­‐
ing.   Most   of   the   young   Muslim   AustraliansͶ82   per  
cent  of  young  Muslim  women  and  78  per  cent  of  young  
Muslim  men  feelingͶfelt  good  about   living   in  Austral-­‐
ia.  One  in  three  (37  per  cent)  of  Muslim  youth  surveyed  
self-­‐identified   as   ͞Australian͟   while   a   similar   number  
(37  per  cent)  gave  their  identity  as  ͞Australian  Muslim͟.  
Another  one  in   five  (19  per  cent)  responded  that  they  
were   of   hybrid   identity,   a   combination   of   Australian  
with   some   other   ethnicity   or   nationality.   In   other  
words,  the  vast  majority  of  Muslim  youth  (93  per  cent)  
surveyed   used   the   identifier   ͞Australian͟   in   part   or  
whole  of  their  identity.  When  compared  to  the  2007  CY  
survey  reported  above,  the  youth  in  the  2010  MY   sur-­‐
vey  was  more   likely   to   identify   as  Australian.  One   ex-­‐
planation   for   this   may   be   that   the   experience   of   the  
Sydney   Cronulla   beach   riots   of   December   2005   reso-­‐
nated  more   in   the  2007   survey   than   the  2010   survey.  
Another  relevant  factor  to  consider   is  that  the  Muslim  
youth  survey  also  included  those  aged  between  18ʹ25  
years.  Even  so,  Muslim  youth  continue  then  to  identify  
as  Australian,  belying  the  fear  expressed  by  some  that  
non-­‐Christian   immigrant   youth   represent   a   threat   to  
Australian  social  cohesion  (Kabir,  2008).    
7.  Cultural  and  Social  Capital    
A   key   aspect   of  minority   immigrant   youth   integration  
relates  to  the  extent  to  which  they  are  socially  included  
in  their  neighbourhood  and,  by  extension,  their  nation.  
In   the  UK  the  Cantel  Report  suggested  that   immigrant  
youth   were   disconnected   from   other   British   youth:  
they   lived   parallel   rather   than   interrelated   lives.   At   a  
neighbourhood   level   the   social   relations   between  mi-­‐
nority   immigrant   youth   and   others   and   their   level   of  
social   interconnectedness   and   trust   with   other   youth  
and   adults   is   thus   an   important   area   of   investigation.  
The  two  Sydney  surveys  canvassed  responses  to  a  wide  
range  of  questions  designed  to  gain  information  about  
the   lives   of   these   immigrant   youth,   their   friendship  
networks,  values,  aspirations,  identities  and  belonging.  
In  the  2007  CALD  youth  survey  most  young  people  sur-­‐
veyed   reported   that   they  had  multicultural   social  net-­‐
works  and  lived  lives  connected  to  youth  of  other  eth-­‐
nic,   cultural   or   religious   background.   The   survey  
provides   strong   evidence   that   social   cohesion   repre-­‐
sents  the  norm  for   inter-­‐ethnic  youth  relations   in  Syd-­‐
ŶĞǇ͛ƐǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĂŶĚ ƐŽƵƚŚ-­‐western   suburbs.   The   young  
people  who  identified  as  ͞Anglo͟Ͷthe  largest  group  in  
the   sampleͶstated   that   in   descending   order   their  
friends  came  from  Australia  (the  majority)  ,  followed  by  
Tonga,  Lebanon,  parts  of  Asia  ,  as  well  as  China  and  Ko-­‐
rea.  The  second   largest  group  was  from  New  Zealand.  
The  majority  of  their  friends  were  Tongan,  Asian  and  Is-­‐
lander.  The  Sudanese  had  the  majority  of  their  friends  
among  Australians  and  among  other  Sudanese,  but  al-­‐
so  among  the  Lebanese  and  Indian  youth.  
The   2010  MY   survey   also   explored   the   friendship  
networks  of  Muslim  youth  in  Sydney.  The  vast  majority  
(80   per   cent)   of   respondents   reported   that   they   had  
non-­‐Muslim  friends.  Only  16  per  cent  of  the  youth  sur-­‐
veyed   had   only   Muslim   friends,   with   Muslim   youth  
aged  under  18  twice  as  likely  to  report  that  all  of  their  
friends  are  Muslim  as  Muslim  youth  aged  over  18.  On  
the  other  hand,  two  in  three  (64  per  cent)  surveyed  re-­‐
ported   that  most   of   their   friends  were  Muslim,  while  
16   per   cent   reported   that   some  of   their   friends  were  
Muslim.  Finally,  questions  about  the  values  and  beliefs  
that   the   Muslim   youth   held   to   be   important   were  
asked.  Two  in  three  replied  that  honesty  and  religious  
practices  were  most   important.  More   than  half  of   the  
respondents   also   listed   responsibility,   tolerance   and  
respect   for  other  people,  politeness  and  neatness  and  
patience  as  key  values  of  the  Muslim  home.  Other  im-­‐
portant   values  were  hard  work,   independence,  obedi-­‐
ence,   leadership   and   imagination.   Clearly   these   are  
values  that  are  consistent  with  ͞Australian  values͟,  and  
they   challenge   arguments   that   present   Islam   as   a  
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threat  to  the  Australian  way  of  life.  
Discrimination  is  an  issue  of  key  concern  to  Austral-­‐
ŝĂ͛ƐDƵƐůŝŵĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͛ƉŽƐƚϵͬϭϭ͘tĞƚŚƵƐĂƐŬĞĚƚŚĞ
Muslim  youth  surveyed  about  their  experiences  of  dis-­‐
crimination   at   school   and   in   the   public   domain.   Just  
over  one  half   of   respondents   (55  per   cent)   had  never  
experienced  discrimination  at  school,  while  11  per  cent  
reported   one   incidence   of   discrimination.   30   per   cent  
reported   that   they   had   experienced   discrimination   a  
few  times  and  4  per  cent  reported  that  they  had  expe-­‐
rienced  discrimination  often.  While   two   in   three  Mus-­‐
lim  youth  who  attend  Muslim  schools  had  never  expe-­‐
rienced   discrimination   at   school,   one   in   two   who  
attended   non-­‐Muslim   schools   had   never   experienced  
discrimination  at  school.  Experiences  of  discrimination  
at   school   increased   with   the   age   of   the   respondent.  
This  issue  was  not  explored  in  the  2007  survey.  
Muslim   youth   experiences   of   discrimination   in   the  
public   domain  were   also   explored.  Only   a  minority   of  
respondents  (28  per  cent)  reported  that  they  had  nev-­‐
er  experienced  discrimination   in  public.  Most  of   those  
Muslim  youth  surveyed  reported  experiencing  discrim-­‐
ination  once  (19  per  cent)  or  a  few  times  (45  per  cent).  
When  the  gender  dimension   is  explored,  slightly  more  
young  Muslim  women  reported  experiencing  discrimi-­‐
nation  in  public,  than  young  Muslim  men,  though  gen-­‐
der  differences  do  not  appear  to  be  significantly  differ-­‐
ent  in  this  regards.  Responses  to  women  who  wear  the  
hijab  are  a  key  factor  here.  
8.  Marginalisation,  Inclusion,  Transformation  and  
Public  Policy  
While  immigrant  youth  make  up  about  one  in  five  of  the  
youth   population,   in   parts   of   Australian   cities   where  
their   communities   are   concentrated,   seven   in   ten   of  
overseas  born  youth  are  not  of  European  origin.  Two  in  
five  of  North  African  and  Middle  East  youth,  and  a  quar-­‐
ter   of   South  and  Central  Asian   youth  are  Muslim   (ABS,  
2011).   Thus   in   a   comparatively   short   period,   working  
class   urban   minority   youth,   once   thought   of   as   being  
predominantly  from  southern  European  origins,  are  now  
far  more  likely  to  have  African,  Middle  Eastern  or  South  
Asian   cultural   backgrounds.   On   the   other   hand,   urban  
minority  youth  also  increasingly  come  from  middle  class  
and  professional   immigrant   families  of  Chinese,   Korean  
or   Indian   cultural   backgrounds   (Collins,   2013).   What  
then   are   the   implications   of   our   research   about   their  
identities   and   experiences   for   both   scholarly   questions  
about  approaches  to  analysing  ͞ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇͬ͟͞ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ͟  re-­‐
lations,   and   policy   questions   about   appropriate   strate-­‐
gies  for  government  and  civil  society  programs?  
We   have   argued   that   the   public  moral   panic   over  
identification   and   participation   of   minority   youth   ob-­‐
scures  four  more  deeply  rooted  factors,  namely:    
x rapidly   changing   economic   circumstances   and  
the   impact   of   these   changes   on   labour  market  
demand  and  skill  availability;  
x geographical  segregation  and  the  differentiation  
in  opportunity  that  such  segregation  intensifies;  
x enlivening   of   diasporic   linkages   to   countries   of  
origin   through   the   ease   of   communication   and  
travel  together  undermining  the  ͞tyranny  of  dis-­‐
tance͟;  and    
x widely   divergent   assessments   of   the   value   of  
the  cultural  and  social  capital  minority  youth  in-­‐
herit,  reproduce  and  create.  
In  a  multicultural  society  there  can  be  no  single  ͞culture͟;  
but  rather  a  complex   intertwining  of  cultural  fragments  
͞sewn   together͟   from   time-­‐   and   place-­‐inflected   life  
ecologies.  These  fragments,  of  different  weights,  draw  
in  dominant  culture  expectations  and  resources,  ethno-­‐
cultural   familial   experiences,   intergenerational   peer  
group  cultures,  and  global  youth  cultural  ideas  and  de-­‐
sires.  On  reflection,  these  fragments  are  integrated  in-­‐
to  personal  narratives  that  call  up  a  hybrid   identity,   in  
which  young  people  talk  about  the  situational  and  con-­‐
textual  bases  for  expressing  one  aspect  of  their  identity  
over  others.    
Given  the  changing  economic  context,  overlaid  with  
cultural   power   hierarchies   and   public   discourses   that  
regularly  problematize  the  presence  of  minority  youth,  
one  of  the  most   important  parameters  of   social  trans-­‐
formation  will   be   the  possibilities   associated  with   sta-­‐
ble,   satisfying   and   reasonably-­‐remunerated   employ-­‐
ment.  We  can  see  in  the  current  recalibration  of  labour  
markets,  that  younger  people  with  limited  or  inflexible  
labour  market  skills  will  experience  greater  difficulty  in  
securing   work.   Compounded   by   discrimination   in   the  
labour  market   and   stigmatisation   in   the   discourses   of  
the  wider  media,  finding  worthwhile   job  opportunities  
presents  its  own  set  of  very  real  challenges.    
The   cultural   geography  of  Australian   cities  has  not  
created   the   mono-­‐   or   bi-­‐cultural   urban   enclaves   that  
produced  the  ͞parallel   lives͟  of  minority  youth  in  Brit-­‐
ain.  The  multicultural  neighbourhoods  of  Australian  cit-­‐
ies   allow   for   more   cosmopolitan   international   and  
friendship  networks  to  develop.  Nevertheless  evidence  
persists  of  the  reinforcing  processes  of  marginalisation,  
in  which  racism  plays  a  rather  too  important  role.  Our  
research   shows   that   minority   youth   do   identify   with  
their   neighbourhoods   and   localities,   feeling   that   they  
have   a   stake   in   the   local   turf,   yet   a  minority   are   less  
comfortable  even   in  the  spaces   in  which  they   live  com-­‐
pared  with  young  people  of  Australian  majority  heritage.    
Possibly   the   most   challenging   aspect   of   the   social  
transformations   in  which  minority  youth  are  entwined  
relate  to  their  sense  of  personal  value  and  worth.  Giv-­‐
en  that  identity  builds  through  praxis,  that  is  to  say  the  
performance   and   production   of   self   in   a   complex   and  
resistant  world,  every  component  plays  a  contributing  
role.  Minority  youth  draw  on  cultural  capital  that  they  
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possess  (from  the  sources  discussed  above)  and  in  the  
process  utilise  and  contribute   to   the  building  of   social  
capital.  It  is  apparent  from  the  findings  that  there  is  ev-­‐
idence   for  ͞bridging   social   capital͟,   and   that  ͞bonding  
social  capital͟  is  quite  well  developed  in  comparison  to  
relations   they   have   into   wider   institutions   and   across  
into  other  social  groups.  This  is  not  unusual  for  minori-­‐
ty  immigrant  communities  experiencing  significant  lev-­‐
els  of  discrimination,  racism  and  various  forms  of   ineq-­‐
uity.   Their   capacity   to   enter   into   wider   social   and  
economic  relations  will  therefore  depend  heavily  on  the  
success   they   have   in   gaining   educational   and   training  
qualifications.   The   minority   of   minority   youth   who   do  
not  succeed  in  the  educational  system  (and  the  majority  
clearly  are  able  to  gain  social  mobility  in  the  generation  
after   their   ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ͛ ĂƌƌŝǀĂůͿ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚ ďǇ ůĂďŽƵƌ
markets  far  less  interested  in  unskilled  school  leavers.    
The  public  policy   implications  of   this   research  also  
require   us   to   link   together   the   four   critical   compo-­‐
nents.   Social   inclusion   will   depend   on   awareness   and  
careful   appreciation   of   local   economic   environments  
and   the   sorts   of   skills   that   are   increasingly   required.  
Urban   regional   employment   and   educational   intelli-­‐
gence  strategies  across  three  levels  of  government,  in-­‐
corporating   civil   society   and   business   organisations  
should   plan   to   integrate   technology   and   employment  
forecasting,  with  flexible  forms  of  educational  delivery  
at   school,   in   technical   and   further   education   (TAFE),  
and   in   more   specialised   professional   areas.   Unfortu-­‐
nately  national  policy  priorities  have  moved  away  from  
concerns   that   would   directly   address   the   employ-­‐
ment/social   inclusion  nexus  (the  Coalition  government  
ŚĂƐ ĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶĐůƵͲ
sion   strategy   and   the   Board   that   managed   it,   while  
state   governments   are   reducing   funding   to   the   TAFE  
sectors   in   New   South   Wales   and   Victoria).   Moreover  
the   national   government   has   argued   that   the  market  
should  determine  the  survival  of  businesses,  and  those  
that  are  not  viable   in  a   free  market  should  be  permit-­‐
ted  to  disintegrate.  The  most  significant  concentrations  
of  most  vulnerable  minority  youth  live  in  regions  where  
͞old   industry͟   is   most   prevalent,   and   they   are   there-­‐
fore  most  likely  to  experience  the  closure  of  industries  
that  in  the  past  offered  significant  employment  to  their  
parents   and   elder   siblings.   Industry   redeployment  
strategies   should   therefore   include   those   ͞not   yet͟   in  
the  workforce  as  an  element  in  any  equation.    
Even   though   Australia   is   a   multicultural   society,  
many   public   narratives   of   contemporary   life   tend   to  
portray  minority  youth  as  antagonistic  to  the  core  val-­‐
ues   of   society.   Yet   our   findings   demonstrate   that   on  
many  counts  minority  youth  hold  very  strongly  to  what  
might  be  seen  as  core  Australian  values,  especially  val-­‐
ues  associated  with  more  conservative  faith  communi-­‐
ties.  Moreover,  they  have  strong  aspirations  and  see  a  
very   strong  and  positive   future   for   themselves   in  Aus-­‐
tralia  in  the  coming  decades.    
While   the   public   policy   implications   require   more  
attention   than   can   be   given   here,   two   cultural   policy  
trajectories  need  to  be  reinforced.  First  sustained  work  
is  needed  with  the  media  by  government  and  civil  soci-­‐
ety  to  reduce  the  negative  and  stereotypical  represen-­‐
tation   of   minorities   as   threats   or   victims.   The   media  
will  need  to  take  greater  responsibility  for  opening  op-­‐
portunities   for   the  representation  of  and  participation  
of  minority  youth  as  the  subjects  in  their  own  and  wid-­‐
er   Australian   narratives,   from   advertising   to   drama,  
from   news   and   current   affairs,   to   comedy   and  melo-­‐
drama.  Where  this  proves  effective  it  can  increase  the  
confidence  and  therefore  the  participation  of  minority  
youth,  while  also  reducing  the  apprehension  expressed  
by  older  Australian  communities  about  newer  and  un-­‐
familiar  arrivals.  There  is  also  a  clear  need  to  strength-­‐
en   anti-­‐racist   discrimination   institutions,   policies   and  
practices  in  Australia,  though  the  current  trend  is  strong-­‐
ly  in  the  opposite  direction.  
Finally   a   wider   societal   conversation   needs   to  
emerge  that  can  discuss  what  it  means  to  have  a  multi-­‐
cultural  society  that  reduces  the  salience  of  ethnicity  as  
a   barrier   to  mobility   and   participation,  while   support-­‐
ing  the  development  of  cultural  expressions  that  bridge  
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͛ƐŵĂŶǇ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͕ ŚŽǁͲ
ever   ͞novel͟   they  may   appear   to   ͞old   Australia͟.   The  
social  transformations  sweeping  through  Australia  as  a  
consequence   of   global,   national   and   regional   changes  
will  carry  serious  consequences  for  cohesion  and  inclu-­‐
sion.  Recognition  of  the  dangers  and  the  identification  
of  the  opportunities  may  ensure  that  their  impact  leads  
to  greater  future  economic  prosperity,  mobility  and  so-­‐
cio-­‐cultural  integration.  
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